Artsakh’s Military Disaster And The Writings All Over The Wall

 

 

With the end of military hostilities on the multiple war theaters of Artsakh on November 09, 2020, several military and political analysts who have followed closely the unfolding of the disastrous military campaign raised a long list of critical questions that must be answered, especially that there is a clear consensus in political and military circles that the conflict is not over. At best with the introduction of Russian peace keepers in the region, all three victorious parties (Turkey, Azerbaijan, Russia) managed to freeze the conflict, without addressing the root causes that started the conflict back in 1989, paved the way for the Armenian victory in 1994, and imposed the November 2020 tragedy with the Russian-brokered cease fire agreement.

Konstantin Eggert (a.k.a. Konstantin von Eggert) a well-respected journalist and analyst, raised multiple concerns that cannot be dismissed very easily, especially if The Army of The Republic of Armenia and the “Intelligence Community” are determined to avoid the repetition of the same mistakes in the future, when Turkish dreams of Pan Turkism/Turanism, and the conquest of new spheres of economic dominance, clash with Russian geopolitical interests to preserve a firm control on the Caucasus. Remember gangsters maintain a unanimous agreement about robbing a bank. After the bank is looted, at the stage where the loot must be divided between the criminals involved in the planning and robbing of the bank, disagreements surface for trivial reasons and often force gang members to eliminate each other. State actors involved in Artsakh’s tragedy are the same. They were in full agreement about dismembering Artsakh, but dividing the spoils of war will ineluctably pave the way for more military hostilities.

In his recent articles Mr. Eggert raised two important questions:

a)     “If Russian intelligence knew about the impending attack, then why didn't they share information about it with Armenia?”

b)     “… why didn't Putin drop a hint to Baku: hey, we know everything, we advise you to think carefully before going to war? It turns out that either Moscow betrayed Yerevan, or Russian intelligence, including electronic, is so useless that there is no way that it can be trusted. 

 

To Mr. Eggert challenging questions we will add (throughout this article) our own list of questions, especially after the revelations made in Yerevan, on Nov.17, 2020 by the Head of the Defense Forces HQ of Armenia Colonel-General Onik Gasparyan. We will answer also the questions raised, full of hope that the information displayed will force us to reconsider a long list of factors that must be seriously re-evaluated if we, as a nation (fatherland/Diapora), want to be ready for the next round of military hostilities.

Back to the questions of Mr. Eggert. “Did Russian Intelligence know about the impending attack?” The answer is an unequivocal “YES”. Two weeks before the Azeri offensive of Sept. 27, 2020, an Azeri General directly involved in the planning of the Azeri “Blitzkrieg” on the contact lines of Artsakh, had transmitted to Russian Intelligence all the details, from the very trivial to the very critical, of the operational blue print adopted by The Azeri General Staff to destroy Artsakh in a swift surprise attack. The Russian “Asset” (The Azeri General) was financially rewarded for his efforts, but his handler failed to do anything to prevent his demise, when on the night of Sept. 27, 2020 while Azeri Divisions launched their attack all along the contact lines of Artsakh, six agents from the Counter-Intelligence Directorate of The Azeri National Security apparatus, acting on information supplied by Turkish Intelligence, arrested the General and charged him with espionage.

We believe based on “Open Source” intelligence available on the internet, that the hostile intentions of the Turkish and Azebaijani Armed Forces were very obvious based on the joint military manoeuvres conducted between July 29 and August 10, in Baku, Nakhichevan, Ganja, Kurdamir and Yevlakh. Russian spy satellites and electronic ground based monitoring stations were collecting massive amount of information about the emphasis placed by the two armies on drone warfare. But collecting information does not necessarily equal a good understanding of your enemies’ intentions. 

To reassure its regional partners about the Russian readiness to intervene militarily if expansionist hostile intentions (Turkish in origin) target the Caucasus, Russia held also a snap joint military manoeuvres between July 17 and July 22 in preparation for a more extensive military operations that were code named Kavkaz 2020, and implemented  between Sept. 21 and Sept.26, 2020.

Russian intelligence knew that Azerbaijan had managed in a few short years to acquire and refine, with the help of Turkish Military Experts, the sophisticated use of a range of UAVs that will introduce a quantitative and qualitative difference in the battlefields of Artsakh.

Alarmed by Azerbaijani advances in the use of drones and electronic warfare, The Armenian Ministry of Defense announced on July 23, 2020 that it was holding military exercises with Russia to contain the Azeri critical threat of total dominance of The Armenian and Artsakh air space.

The Armenian Army fell in the trap of “The Invincibility Syndrome” and quickly turned the military exercises with Russia into photo ops and shallow congratulatory statements of being ready for the next round of hostilities. The Ministry released a photo of  two Armenian officers standing beside a downed Israeli “suicide” drone, and Ministry spokesman, Mr. Artsrun Hovahnnisyan, proudly pointed out that “the largely intact drone was brought down by an Armenian electronic warfare system.”

For some strange reason/s the Ministry’s specialists and experts failed to realize that the electronic warfare system supplied to Armenia by its Russian ally had already failed dismally in Lybia, and in February and March 2020, Turkish drones decimated Syrian Army thanks advancing on the city of Idlib, and Russian electronic warfare systems inflicted marginal UAV losses that Turkey managed to easily cope with.

The statements made at the end of July 2020 are totally incongruent with facts released on Nov.17, 2020 by the head of Armenian Defence Forces HQ of Armenia Colonel-General Onik Gasparyan.

According to Col. Gen. Onik Gasparyan, he officially assumed his responsibilities as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces on June 8, 2020. On June 12, he exposed Prime Minister Pashinyan to the military-political landscape dominated by the treacherous Turkish presence and the close bonds forged between The Turkish Armed Forces and The Azerbaijani Army. His encounter with PM Pashinyan addressed also the state of readiness of The Armenian Defense Forces to confront the mushrooming threat and defend the fatherland including Artsakh. The same details were reiterated to the members of the Armenia’s Security Council a few days later.

To all concerned parties Col. Gen. Gasparyan clearly pointed out that “Our opponent is no longer only Azerbaijan, but also Turkey. Therefore, Armenia cannot effectively confront the joint military potential of these states and it is necessary to direct all the political and diplomatic potential to avoid or at least postpone the war.”

Now let us review the dates and the chronological development of events. Following the joint manoeuvres of July 2020 with The Russian Army, The Armenian Army was confident that Turkish/Azeri/Israeli drones will not change the balance of power, because electronic counter measures available to Armenia’s armed forces are adequate to maintain the balance.

Col. Gen. Gasparyan was painting a bleak picture to PM Pashinyan on June 12, but endorsing the release of inaccurate details by his Ministry at the end of July 2020. A move that precipitated a misplaced self-confidence that we can win the war, like we always did since 1994, the only difference being that the price tag will be more expensive with the direct involvement of Turkey and Israel in the future military confrontations.

Why did the political leadership reject the advices of Col. Gen. Gasparyan to avoid the war by relying on the “Lavrov Plan” that was strongly recommended by the Russian Foreign Minister to The Armenian government on multiple occasion since 2016.

Yes the “Lavrov Plan” involved sacrifices requiring the return of the seven Azerbaijani districts used as a “Buffer Zone” by Armenia. So what? The war we heroically waged against Turkey, Azerbaijan. And Israel for six weeks extracted a much harsher price tag, the most excruciating portion of it was the loss of 2425 Armenian soldiers who valiantly sacrificed their lives to protect the dignity of the fatherland and Artsakh. If a government is unable to wage a war of attrition against a superior force, why does it, for petty political scores designed to insure its own stay in power, ignore the advices of the military leadership and why does it steer the country to a painful capitulation?

Unconvinced that diplomacy can prevent the descent into hell of Artsakh and Armenia, the next question Col. Gen. Gasparyan had to face from the political leadership of Armenia was: "If we cannot avoid the war, what should we do?"

Instead of insisting that Armenia, short of a direct Divine intervention, should not and cannot face the wrath of three armies (Azerbaijan, Turkey, Israel) and the sophisticated advances they achieved since 2103 in the field of UAV manufacturing and advanced electronic warfare, Col. Gen. Gasparyan hinted that if war is imposed on Artsakh/Armenia, “…we should try to inflict heavy losses on the opponent in the shortest possible time and force it to refrain from further actions.”

A professional Army General, blinded by a loyalty to a political leadership that cannot sustain its “raison d'être” without the appearance (not the substance) of looking tough and refusing to return to the negotiating table, failed to realize that his army is in no position to deliver to the political leadership of Armenia a victory achieved “in the shortest possible time”, especially when your military doctrine and battlefield tactics inherited from the Soviet era, are obsolete and totally ineffective against the high tech warfare the enemy prepared itself for since 2013.

Was there another, more practical option that the general could have suggested and prepared his army accordingly from June 2020 to Sept. 27, 2020? It depends if the General was an avid reader of history books and resources analyzing “Asymmetrical Warfare” principles that destroyed the morale of a technologically and numerically superior army (Israel), and convinced the political/military leadership of the country that it would be senseless to continue to invest tremendous material resources and sustain casualties in a war (Lebanon 2006) that it cannot win. 

 

Baku thanking Israel and the survivors of a holocaust for destroying the army of genocide survivors.

What are we talking about? We are talking about a war were the hostilities between two parties stop, not because the superior army achieves a decisive victory but simply because the decision makers become convinced that they cannot win the war.

Do we have a concrete example? Of course the Israeli/Hezbollah war of 2006. The war was triggered by a surprise attack launched by Hezbollah on July 12, 2006 across the Northern Israeli border, to capture a group of Israeli soldiers and trade them for Hezbollah/Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. Eight Israeli soldiers died and two were captured in the aftermath of the military venture.

Israel launched a massive air assault on Hezbollah targets and with the total control of The Lebanese Air Space made 15.500 sorties, during the 34 days of war, targeting 7000 Hezbollah military vehicles, ammunition storage facilities, command posts, etc…

By July 27, 2006 Israel mobilized 30.000 soldiers and 15.000 of them were assigned to combat duties. Hezbollah had anywhere between 2500 to 3000 fighters involved in the war. Israel lost 119 soldiers and Hezbollah lost 250 to 600 fighters depending on the source you use for your assessments, but Lebanese civilian casualties reached 1191 deaths.

Israeli air superiority had NO impact on Hezbollah’s war conduct. The mightiest Air Force in the Middle East failed to deliver to the Israeli Army a decisive victory, simply because, Hezbollah fighters were operating in small units (10-12 fighters) using hit and run tactics in wooded and mountainous areas where the Israeli Air force was unable to detect and acquire enemy targets.

Each unit was equipped with individual automatic firearms and anti-tank weapons such as Konkurs, Kornet, Metis, AT-3 original version and often modified versions to penetrate the heavy armour of the MERKAVA tanks-the pride of the Israeli military industry.

The Merkava was a state of the art invention of Israel. Its designers called it “The Chariot of God” simply because they believed in the mythical/biblical dimension behind the name. The myth convinced the Israeli Army that the tank is invincible. But when dozens of them were shredded to pieces by the anti-tank weapons of Hezbollah, and after 34 days of sustained relentless attack on Hezbollah positions that failed to produce the two missing soldiers captured by Hezbollah during the initial assault that triggered the war, Israel decided to accept via intermediaries a cease fire agreement. Hezbollah a guerrilla movement did not achieve a decisive victory but it managed to convince the enemy that victory for the Israeli Army will remain an elusive and highly prohibitive goal that should not be pursued.

In a way Hezbollah reminded military analyst worldwide that “It is not the size of the dog that will scare the bear. The ferocity of the battle will force the bear to retreat.” We find it very useful to mention that during the Israeli invasion of 1982, PLO fighters used the same terrain to stop the invasion of The Israeli Army. The PLO fighters used inefficient Soviet military tactics that allowed The Israeli Army, in less than 10 days, to surround 8000 PLO fighters in Beirut the capital of Lebanon-about 115km away from the Israeli border.

In 2006, with the guerrilla hit and run tactics adopted by small fighting units, Hezbollah blocked the advance of The Israeli Army at Bint Jbeil, less than 12km away of the Israeli border. 34 days of war failed to turn around the fortunes of The Israeli Army.

The terrain in Southern Lebanon is similar to Artsakh’s landscape. Why did Col. Gen. Gasparyan fail to realize that adapting his army to the new formations of the multiple enemies Armenia was facing on the eve of Sept. 27, 2020 might bring him a better success?

We don’t know for sure, but it will be interesting to ask him the question and give him a fair chance to reply. 

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